AES or 3DES in smartcards

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AES or 3DES in smartcards

Sarat G
Hi,
I wonder using openssl if one can generate the 2018 cryptographic keys and encrypt the data using those keys, then can't it possible to generate keys and which can be used in AES encryption of data, and appending them to the data by encrypting them with RSA keys.
Because as AES is much computationally efficient than RSA, it can improve the performance of smartcards.
Please correct me if this doesn't make sense.
Regards,
Sarat G



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Re: AES or 3DES in smartcards

Douglas E Engert


On 1/9/2015 9:31 AM, Sarat G wrote:
> Hi,
> I wonder using openssl if one can generate the 2018 cryptographic keys and encrypt the data using those keys, then can't it possible to generate keys and which can be used in AES encryption of data,
> and appending them to the data by encrypting them with RSA keys.
> Because as AES is much computationally efficient than RSA, it can improve the performance of smartcards.

Yes, that is the usual way it is done, for example CMS:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_Message_Syntax




> Please correct me if this doesn't make sense.
> Regards,
> Sarat G
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
> sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
> hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
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> look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> [hidden email]
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>

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Re: AES or 3DES in smartcards

NdK-3
Il 09/01/2015 16:40, Douglas E Engert ha scritto:

>> I wonder using openssl if one can generate the 2018 cryptographic keys and encrypt the data using those keys, then can't it possible to generate keys and which can be used in AES encryption of data,
>> and appending them to the data by encrypting them with RSA keys.
>> Because as AES is much computationally efficient than RSA, it can improve the performance of smartcards.
> Yes, that is the usual way it is done, for example CMS:
>     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_Message_Syntax
IIUC Sarat's question is why doesn't the smartcard do that when used to
encrypt?

If so, the answer is that the sending data to the smartcard is really
slow (IIRC at most about 300kbps but usually way less), so using the
card to symmetrically encrypt a 2MB file would be painfully slow (many
seconds) more than the plain RSA encryption.

BYtE,
 Diego.

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Re: AES or 3DES in smartcards

Douglas E Engert


On 1/9/2015 1:49 PM, NdK wrote:

> Il 09/01/2015 16:40, Douglas E Engert ha scritto:
>
>>> I wonder using openssl if one can generate the 2018 cryptographic keys and encrypt the data using those keys, then can't it possible to generate keys and which can be used in AES encryption of data,
>>> and appending them to the data by encrypting them with RSA keys.
>>> Because as AES is much computationally efficient than RSA, it can improve the performance of smartcards.
>> Yes, that is the usual way it is done, for example CMS:
>>      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_Message_Syntax
> IIUC Sarat's question is why doesn't the smartcard do that when used to
> encrypt?
>
> If so, the answer is that the sending data to the smartcard is really
> slow (IIRC at most about 300kbps but usually way less), so using the
> card to symmetrically encrypt a 2MB file would be painfully slow (many
> seconds) more than the plain RSA encryption.

Maybe I was not clear, most cards don't use symmetric keys (other then for
administrative purposes). The sender uses software to generate the symmetric key and
software is used to encrypt the data. The RSA public key in the certificate of the
recipient held by the sender is used in software to encrypt the symmetric key. The encrypted symmetric key, and
the encrypted data is sent to the recipient.

The recipient uses the RSA private key on the smart card to decrypt the
symmetric key, which is then used in software to decrypt the message.

THe recipients smart card only does one RSA decrypt operation.

With EC, which can not encrypt, two EC keys are used, one from the sender and one from the
recipient to derive the symmetric key which is used to encrypt/decrypt the message. A form
of epherimal DH may be used by the sender. Either the sender or the recipient (or both)
may be using EC keys stored on smart cards.



>
> BYtE,
>   Diego.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
> sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
> hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
> leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
> look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net
> _______________________________________________
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> [hidden email]
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>

--

  Douglas E. Engert  <[hidden email]>


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Re: AES or 3DES in smartcards

William Roberts


On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 12:16 PM, Douglas E Engert <[hidden email]> wrote:


On 1/9/2015 1:49 PM, NdK wrote:
> Il 09/01/2015 16:40, Douglas E Engert ha scritto:
>
>>> I wonder using openssl if one can generate the 2018 cryptographic keys and encrypt the data using those keys, then can't it possible to generate keys and which can be used in AES encryption of data,
>>> and appending them to the data by encrypting them with RSA keys.
>>> Because as AES is much computationally efficient than RSA, it can improve the performance of smartcards.
>> Yes, that is the usual way it is done, for example CMS:
>>      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_Message_Syntax
> IIUC Sarat's question is why doesn't the smartcard do that when used to
> encrypt?
>
> If so, the answer is that the sending data to the smartcard is really
> slow (IIRC at most about 300kbps but usually way less), so using the
> card to symmetrically encrypt a 2MB file would be painfully slow (many
> seconds) more than the plain RSA encryption.

Maybe I was not clear, most cards don't use symmetric keys (other then for
administrative purposes). The sender uses software to generate the symmetric key and
software is used to encrypt the data. The RSA public key in the certificate of the
recipient held by the sender is used in software to encrypt the symmetric key. The encrypted symmetric key, and
the encrypted data is sent to the recipient.

PIV Cards *can* have a symetric 9E key that is often times used for encryption of email, or at least in
the limited scope of what I have seen.
 

The recipient uses the RSA private key on the smart card to decrypt the
symmetric key, which is then used in software to decrypt the message.

THe recipients smart card only does one RSA decrypt operation.

With EC, which can not encrypt, two EC keys are used, one from the sender and one from the
recipient to derive the symmetric key which is used to encrypt/decrypt the message. A form
of epherimal DH may be used by the sender. Either the sender or the recipient (or both)
may be using EC keys stored on smart cards.



>
> BYtE,
>   Diego.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
> sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
> hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
> leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
> look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net
> _______________________________________________
> Opensc-devel mailing list
> [hidden email]
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>

--

  Douglas E. Engert  <[hidden email]>


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--
Respectfully,

William C Roberts


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Re: AES or 3DES in smartcards

Douglas E Engert


On 1/9/2015 3:18 PM, William Roberts wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 12:16 PM, Douglas E Engert <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote:
>
>
>
>     On 1/9/2015 1:49 PM, NdK wrote:
>      > Il 09/01/2015 16:40, Douglas E Engert ha scritto:
>      >
>      >>> I wonder using openssl if one can generate the 2018 cryptographic keys and encrypt the data using those keys, then can't it possible to generate keys and which can be used in AES encryption
>     of data,
>      >>> and appending them to the data by encrypting them with RSA keys.
>      >>> Because as AES is much computationally efficient than RSA, it can improve the performance of smartcards.
>      >> Yes, that is the usual way it is done, for example CMS:
>      >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_Message_Syntax
>      > IIUC Sarat's question is why doesn't the smartcard do that when used to
>      > encrypt?
>      >
>      > If so, the answer is that the sending data to the smartcard is really
>      > slow (IIRC at most about 300kbps but usually way less), so using the
>      > card to symmetrically encrypt a 2MB file would be painfully slow (many
>      > seconds) more than the plain RSA encryption.
>
>     Maybe I was not clear, most cards don't use symmetric keys (other then for
>     administrative purposes). The sender uses software to generate the symmetric key and
>     software is used to encrypt the data. The RSA public key in the certificate of the
>     recipient held by the sender is used in software to encrypt the symmetric key. The encrypted symmetric key, and
>     the encrypted data is sent to the recipient.
>
>
> PIV Cards *can* have a symetric 9E key that is often times used for encryption of email, or at least in
> the limited scope of what I have seen.

The 9E key can by symmetric, but the 9E key is named the "Card Authentication Key"
800-78-2  Table 3-1 and Section 6.3

800-73-3 Part 1 Table 3 "security Condition for Use" for the "Card Authentication Key" is "Always"
meaning it can be used without the PIN.

800-73-3 Part 1 Section B.1.5 Figure B-7  Show how to use it for authentication.
800-73-3 Part 1 Section C.2  Shows how a relying party can look up the key.

Some how using it for e-mail encryption sounds like a misuse of the key with serious security problems.

Since it is symmetric, both the sender and receiver must have a copy of the key.
One of them has the key on the card, the other has it in a data base. Communication between
more then 2 parties, means 2 or more people have a copy of the key that is on your card,
and both could decrypt messages you send to either. This does not scale well for use with e-mail.
They might even be able to impersonate you.

I believe it was meant to be use for physical security, like door locks at your site
or for the card issuer to authenticate the card.

I have not found anywhere in the NIST docs where the 9E should be used for encryption.

The 9D key, "Key Management Key" and its certificate "X.509 Certificate for Key Management"
(and retired keys and their certificates are meant to be used for e-mail encryption,
or key derivation.



>
>
>     The recipient uses the RSA private key on the smart card to decrypt the
>     symmetric key, which is then used in software to decrypt the message.
>
>     THe recipients smart card only does one RSA decrypt operation.
>
>     With EC, which can not encrypt, two EC keys are used, one from the sender and one from the
>     recipient to derive the symmetric key which is used to encrypt/decrypt the message. A form
>     of epherimal DH may be used by the sender. Either the sender or the recipient (or both)
>     may be using EC keys stored on smart cards.
>
>
>
>      >
>      > BYtE,
>      >   Diego.
>      >
>      > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>      > Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
>      > sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
>      > hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
>      > leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
>      > look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net
>      > _______________________________________________
>      > Opensc-devel mailing list
>      > [hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>
>      > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>      >
>
>     --
>
>        Douglas E. Engert  <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>>
>
>
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>     Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
>     sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
>     hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
>     leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
>     look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net
>     _______________________________________________
>     Opensc-devel mailing list
>     [hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>
>     https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
>
>
>
>
> --
> Respectfully,
>
> William C Roberts
>

--

  Douglas E. Engert  <[hidden email]>


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Re: AES or 3DES in smartcards

William Roberts


On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 3:33 PM, Douglas E Engert <[hidden email]> wrote:


On 1/9/2015 3:18 PM, William Roberts wrote:


On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 12:16 PM, Douglas E Engert <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote:



    On 1/9/2015 1:49 PM, NdK wrote:
     > Il 09/01/2015 16:40, Douglas E Engert ha scritto:
     >
     >>> I wonder using openssl if one can generate the 2018 cryptographic keys and encrypt the data using those keys, then can't it possible to generate keys and which can be used in AES encryption
    of data,
     >>> and appending them to the data by encrypting them with RSA keys.
     >>> Because as AES is much computationally efficient than RSA, it can improve the performance of smartcards.
     >> Yes, that is the usual way it is done, for example CMS:
     >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_Message_Syntax
     > IIUC Sarat's question is why doesn't the smartcard do that when used to
     > encrypt?
     >
     > If so, the answer is that the sending data to the smartcard is really
     > slow (IIRC at most about 300kbps but usually way less), so using the
     > card to symmetrically encrypt a 2MB file would be painfully slow (many
     > seconds) more than the plain RSA encryption.

    Maybe I was not clear, most cards don't use symmetric keys (other then for
    administrative purposes). The sender uses software to generate the symmetric key and
    software is used to encrypt the data. The RSA public key in the certificate of the
    recipient held by the sender is used in software to encrypt the symmetric key. The encrypted symmetric key, and
    the encrypted data is sent to the recipient.


PIV Cards *can* have a symetric 9E key that is often times used for encryption of email, or at least in
the limited scope of what I have seen.

The 9E key can by symmetric, but the 9E key is named the "Card Authentication Key"
800-78-2  Table 3-1 and Section 6.3

800-73-3 Part 1 Table 3 "security Condition for Use" for the "Card Authentication Key" is "Always"
meaning it can be used without the PIN.

800-73-3 Part 1 Section B.1.5 Figure B-7  Show how to use it for authentication.
800-73-3 Part 1 Section C.2  Shows how a relying party can look up the key.

Some how using it for e-mail encryption sounds like a misuse of the key with serious security problems.

Since it is symmetric, both the sender and receiver must have a copy of the key.
One of them has the key on the card, the other has it in a data base. Communication between
more then 2 parties, means 2 or more people have a copy of the key that is on your card,
and both could decrypt messages you send to either. This does not scale well for use with e-mail.
They might even be able to impersonate you.

I believe it was meant to be use for physical security, like door locks at your site
or for the card issuer to authenticate the card.

I have not found anywhere in the NIST docs where the 9E should be used for encryption.

The 9D key, "Key Management Key" and its certificate "X.509 Certificate for Key Management"
(and retired keys and their certificates are meant to be used for e-mail encryption,
or key derivation.

Yeah their claimed use of that key for that didn't sit well with me, but perhaps the person saying it was wrong. I made him
re-iterate and phonetically spell out the key in use, and it was def 9E.
 





    The recipient uses the RSA private key on the smart card to decrypt the
    symmetric key, which is then used in software to decrypt the message.

    THe recipients smart card only does one RSA decrypt operation.

    With EC, which can not encrypt, two EC keys are used, one from the sender and one from the
    recipient to derive the symmetric key which is used to encrypt/decrypt the message. A form
    of epherimal DH may be used by the sender. Either the sender or the recipient (or both)
    may be using EC keys stored on smart cards.



     >
     > BYtE,
     >   Diego.
     >
     > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     > Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
     > sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
     > hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
     > leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
     > look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net
     > _______________________________________________
     > Opensc-devel mailing list
     > [hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>
     > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel
     >

    --

       Douglas E. Engert  <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>>


    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
    sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
    hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
    leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
    look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net
    _______________________________________________
    Opensc-devel mailing list
    [hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>
    https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel




--
Respectfully,

William C Roberts


--

 Douglas E. Engert  <[hidden email]>




--
Respectfully,

William C Roberts


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Re: AES or 3DES in smartcards

Douglas E Engert


On 1/9/2015 5:42 PM, William Roberts wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 3:33 PM, Douglas E Engert <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote:
>
>
>
>     On 1/9/2015 3:18 PM, William Roberts wrote:
>
>
>
>         On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 12:16 PM, Douglas E Engert <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]> <mailto:[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>>> wrote:
>
>
>
>              On 1/9/2015 1:49 PM, NdK wrote:
>               > Il 09/01/2015 16:40, Douglas E Engert ha scritto:
>               >
>               >>> I wonder using openssl if one can generate the 2018 cryptographic keys and encrypt the data using those keys, then can't it possible to generate keys and which can be used in AES
>         encryption
>              of data,
>               >>> and appending them to the data by encrypting them with RSA keys.
>               >>> Because as AES is much computationally efficient than RSA, it can improve the performance of smartcards.
>               >> Yes, that is the usual way it is done, for example CMS:
>               >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/__Cryptographic_Message_Syntax <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_Message_Syntax>
>               > IIUC Sarat's question is why doesn't the smartcard do that when used to
>               > encrypt?
>               >
>               > If so, the answer is that the sending data to the smartcard is really
>               > slow (IIRC at most about 300kbps but usually way less), so using the
>               > card to symmetrically encrypt a 2MB file would be painfully slow (many
>               > seconds) more than the plain RSA encryption.
>
>              Maybe I was not clear, most cards don't use symmetric keys (other then for
>              administrative purposes). The sender uses software to generate the symmetric key and
>              software is used to encrypt the data. The RSA public key in the certificate of the
>              recipient held by the sender is used in software to encrypt the symmetric key. The encrypted symmetric key, and
>              the encrypted data is sent to the recipient.
>
>
>         PIV Cards *can* have a symetric 9E key that is often times used for encryption of email, or at least in
>         the limited scope of what I have seen.
>
>
>     The 9E key can by symmetric, but the 9E key is named the "Card Authentication Key"
>     800-78-2  Table 3-1 and Section 6.3
>
>     800-73-3 Part 1 Table 3 "security Condition for Use" for the "Card Authentication Key" is "Always"
>     meaning it can be used without the PIN.
>
>     800-73-3 Part 1 Section B.1.5 Figure B-7  Show how to use it for authentication.
>     800-73-3 Part 1 Section C.2  Shows how a relying party can look up the key.
>
>     Some how using it for e-mail encryption sounds like a misuse of the key with serious security problems.
>
>     Since it is symmetric, both the sender and receiver must have a copy of the key.
>     One of them has the key on the card, the other has it in a data base. Communication between
>     more then 2 parties, means 2 or more people have a copy of the key that is on your card,
>     and both could decrypt messages you send to either. This does not scale well for use with e-mail.
>     They might even be able to impersonate you.
>
>     I believe it was meant to be use for physical security, like door locks at your site
>     or for the card issuer to authenticate the card.
>
>     I have not found anywhere in the NIST docs where the 9E should be used for encryption.
>
>     The 9D key, "Key Management Key" and its certificate "X.509 Certificate for Key Management"
>     (and retired keys and their certificates are meant to be used for e-mail encryption,
>     or key derivation.
>
>
> Yeah their claimed use of that key for that didn't sit well with me, but perhaps the person saying it was wrong. I made him
> re-iterate and phonetically spell out the key in use, and it was def 9E.

How did they get the symmetric 9E key? The card issuer would have had to set it,
If they are a federal agency, they should question if they are at risk.
Are they writing the key themselves? This would require the transport keys from the card vendor.

Even using the RSA 9E, it does not require the PIN, so it is only proving possession of the card,
not the user using the card.

On my old PIV card issued by OMB, the 9E cert had these extensions:
  X509v3 extensions:
             X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                 Digital Signature
             X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical
                 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.8
             X509v3 Certificate Policies:
                 Policy: 2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.17

The 9D cert has:

        X509v3 extensions:
             X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                 Key Encipherment
             X509v3 Certificate Policies:
                 Policy: 2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.7


and the SubjectAltName was my email address.


>
>
>
>
>
>
>              The recipient uses the RSA private key on the smart card to decrypt the
>              symmetric key, which is then used in software to decrypt the message.
>
>              THe recipients smart card only does one RSA decrypt operation.
>
>              With EC, which can not encrypt, two EC keys are used, one from the sender and one from the
>              recipient to derive the symmetric key which is used to encrypt/decrypt the message. A form
>              of epherimal DH may be used by the sender. Either the sender or the recipient (or both)
>              may be using EC keys stored on smart cards.
>
>
>
>               >
>               > BYtE,
>               >   Diego.
>               >
>               > ------------------------------__------------------------------__------------------
>               > Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
>               > sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
>               > hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
>               > leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
>               > look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.__net <http://goparallel.sourceforge.net>
>               > _________________________________________________
>               > Opensc-devel mailing list
>               > [hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]> <mailto:[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>>
>               > https://lists.sourceforge.net/__lists/listinfo/opensc-devel <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel>
>               >
>
>              --
>
>                 Douglas E. Engert  <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]> <mailto:[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>>>
>
>
>              ------------------------------__------------------------------__------------------
>              Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
>              sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
>              hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
>              leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
>              look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.__net <http://goparallel.sourceforge.net>
>              _________________________________________________
>              Opensc-devel mailing list
>         [hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]> <mailto:[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>>
>         https://lists.sourceforge.net/__lists/listinfo/opensc-devel <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel>
>
>
>
>
>         --
>         Respectfully,
>
>         William C Roberts
>
>
>     --
>
>       Douglas E. Engert  <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Respectfully,
>
> William C Roberts
>

--

  Douglas E. Engert  <[hidden email]>


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website,
sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net
_______________________________________________
Opensc-devel mailing list
[hidden email]
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/opensc-devel